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and transfer pricing. The aim of this article is to find the determinants of the tax burden faced by 
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was established as a new dependent variable. The panel data used include Czech companies that 
are owned by parent companies located in other EU countries. The model distinguishes EU tax 
havens from regular member states; sector dummy variables are also included. The regression 
model that was created did not confirm the assumed dependencies. Rather, it indicated other 
important determinants: profitability, the share of intangible assets, size, and the dummy variable 
for the ICT sector. Based on the regression results, the independent variables connected with 
known tax planning schemes have relatively low importance. The significance of these results can 
be seen in the subsequent conclusions. First of all, there is no difference between the subsidiaries’ 
tax burdens based on the parent company’s location. Corporations use international tax planning 
whether or not they are owned from a tax haven. The second significant conclusion indicates the 
importance of certain sectors and their attributes concerning the tax burden. Companies from 
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Introduction
Managers seek every opportunity to increase 
the profitability of their company’s investments. 
They also encounter various types of costs – 
from the managerial perspective, these include 
paid taxes. Therefore, the management at 
multinational corporations takes advantage of 
the global digital economy and tries to plan tax 
liabilities in order to minimize them. Ignoring 
the opportunity to avoid taxes can result in 
a less competitive position. Tax planning has 
become an important tool for achieving better 
financial results. Within the global economy, 
the international aspect of tax planning is 
a key factor for multinational corporation 
management.
The importance of tax burdens can also be 
seen in decision making on where to invest. 
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Lower tax burdens can increase an investment’s 
profitability; therefore, managers incorporate 
rating tax legislation into their decision-making 
process for investment. Evaluation includes not 
only the laws in the intended target country but 
also the domestic country’s tax legislation and 
tax treaties. International tax planning is based 
on cross-border payments, and their taxation 
should be considered previous to investment. 
Governments respond to managers’ demands 
and alter tax legislation in order to attract 
investments, which causes tax competition to 
arise (Wiebe, 2011). Tax competition results in 
tax havens, whose aim is to attract multinational 
companies to achieve higher tax revenues, 
gain extensive investment, or create more jobs.
Tax havens’ effect on the tax burden of 
multinational corporations has been demonstrated 
by a number of studies (Markle & Shackelford, 
2014; Schulte et al., 2017; Davies et al., 2018). 
However, all recent studies have assessed the 
tax burden from the perspective of an entire 
group or parent company. The question then 
arises as to what role the subsidiaries play within 
tax planning schemes. First, subsidiaries may be 
established in a tax haven only for tax purposes 
(a common view), or they may be operating 
companies within the group that have the 
company in a tax haven as their parent company 
(this reverse scheme can also achieve a tax 
advantage). There are many companies owned 
from abroad in the Czech Republic, and there are 
frequent debates about the use of tax planning 
and tax revenue losses (Moravec et al., 2019). 
Therefore, it is important to study subsidiaries’ 
position within international tax planning, even if 
they do not reside in a tax haven. How a specific 
non-tax-haven country with many foreign-owned 
companies is positioned regarding tax planning 
was also shown in the first studies focused on 
Czech companies (Janský & Kokeš, 2015; 
Janský, 2017). The use of tax havens by Czech 
companies shows some anomalies compared to 
the results of studies involving companies from 
several countries around the world.
The aim of this paper is to find the 
determinants of the tax burden faced by 
subsidiaries in a non-tax-haven country. The 
specific positioning of the operating subsidiaries 
has not been included in recent studies, and it 
can be assumed that their tax burden may show 
some determinants other than the usual ones.
The following section deals with the 
current state of knowledge on the outlined 
topic. The next section of the paper describes 
the methods used, followed by a presentation 
of the model’s results. In the subsequent 
section, the concrete results are discussed in 
the context of the current state of knowledge, 
and recommendations for further research are 
outlined. Conclusions based on the previous 
sections follow.
1.	 Theoretical	Background
Tax planning can be defined as any type of 
activity with the special purpose of reducing 
tax liability (OECD, 2020a). There are three 
basic methods used in international tax 
planning schemes: royalties (connected with 
the intellectual property), interest payments 
(intra-group loans are key), and transfer pricing 
(European Commission, 2016; Auerbach et al., 
2017). The study of one concrete multinational 
company (Cadbury Schweppes) demonstrated 
the inclination of managers to use transfer 
pricing more than internal debt (Schenkelberg, 
2020). The greater importance of transfer 
pricing – in addition to the use of licenses 
and royalties – is also shown in a study by 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017). Where 
governments are concerned, transfer pricing is 
approximately 1% of the total French collected 
taxes (Davies et al., 2018). Naturally, not all 
multinational corporations use transfer pricing in 
order to avoid taxes. Klassen et al. (2017) show 
that there are differences between managers’ 
approaches to transfer pricing. It has also been 
proved that IP assets play a significant role in 
international tax planning (Arcalean, 2017). 
Because of their mobility, intangible assets are 
a suitable instrument to adopt as part of specific 
tax planning schemes (Griffith et al., 2014). 
Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) demonstrate the 
use of this mobility, concluding that patents 
within a group are placed in countries with 
a lower tax burden. The negative effect of 
intangible assets on effective tax rates was also 
verified by Klassen et al. (2017). The presence 
of an IP box even increases the advantage of 
using intangible assets for tax planning to such 
an extent that effective average tax rates can 
achieve negative values (Evers et al., 2015). 
Although the first two methods are used more 
commonly, intra-group loans are also included 
in managerial practice. German multinational 
companies use internal debt financing when 
at least one of their subsidiaries is located in 
a country with a low tax burden (Buettner & 
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Wamser, 2013). Naturally, the tax planning 
issue also has another side. Certain managers, 
for whom reputation is important, do not 
implement tax planning (Graham et al., 2014), 
because public pressure is an important factor, 
especially for widely known multinationals 
(Campbell & Helleloid, 2016).
Concerning international organizations, 
there is a tendency towards minimizing the 
opportunities for international tax planning. The 
OECD (2020b) uses its BEPS (Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting) project, and the European 
Commission (2020) investigates tax planning 
cases, because a bilateral agreement between 
a company and the government can result in 
an unauthorized subsidy. The attitudes of the 
OECD and the European Commission are 
characterized by an emphasis on the role of 
countries – more precisely governments – as 
bearing the responsibility for the negative 
impact of international tax planning.
These two organizations have come up 
with their own lists of tax havens, although 
both initiatives have some gaps. The OECD’s 
list (2020c) is now empty, and the one by the 
European Commission (2018a) only deals with 
non-member countries. However, tax havens 
do exist in the European Union, which has 
been confirmed by the European Commission’s 
own investigation as well as by other studies 
(Gravelle, 2015; Berkhout, 2016; Chardonnet 
& Langerock, 2017). These studies confirm 
the importance of EU countries like the 
Netherlands or Luxembourg in international 
tax planning. From the perspective of tax 
planning research, it is crucial to define the set 
of tax havens correctly. EU tax havens can be 
seen as a gateway for connecting companies 
operating in other EU countries and tax havens 
outside the EU; in some cases, the tax planning 
scheme does not require the presence of tax 
havens outside the EU (European Commission, 
2016).
The importance of companies having an 
international aspect was shown by Rego (2003) 
and Desai et al. (2006); large US companies 
with higher levels of internationalization use 
tax havens more than other firms. Not only 
was the international aspect studied, but the 
actual effects of tax haven connections were 
also given substantial attention. Schulte et al. 
(2017) illustrated the importance of the number 
of subsidiaries located in tax havens. Groups 
with more subsidiaries in tax havens tend 
to use international tax planning to a larger 
extent. Integrating a subsidiary located in 
a tax haven reduces the group’s tax burden, 
especially when it is this type of company’s first 
establishment (Markle & Shackelford, 2014). 
Similar results were also presented in a study of 
US companies by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
Based on known tax planning schemes, EU 
tax havens are the most important from the 
perspective of the operating subsidiaries (e.g., 
companies in the Czech Republic or Slovakia), 
because the operating companies are directly 
connected to them.
Consequently, several limitations have 
emerged in connection with the current studies. 
The approach taken by most researchers 
consists of assessing dependencies within 
a large dataset covering several countries from 
different parts of the world (Dischinger et al., 
2014; Markle & Shackelford, 2014; Delgado 
et al., 2014). On the other hand, there are also 
studies that show the differences between 
countries regarding tax planning activities. Yoo 
and Lee (2019) demonstrate the importance 
of national culture and its characteristics, such 
as individualism. Jones and Temouri (2016) 
distinguish countries by type of economy, with 
the conclusion that multinational corporations 
originally from liberal market economies (e.g., 
the USA, the United Kingdom, or Australia) 
use tax havens more than companies from 
coordinated market economies (Germany, 
Sweden, or Austria). Studies focusing only on 
the Czech Republic also confirm that the results 
from worldwide studies cannot be transferred; 
the conclusions for Czech companies are not 
as clear or as significant (Janský & Kokeš, 
2015, 2016).
The latest development in international tax 
planning is connected to activities in certain 
sectors. The advancement of information 
technology is also helping international tax 
planning evolve further. This can be evidenced 
by activities of the OECD (2020d), the 
European Commission (2018b), and individual 
countries (Asen, 2019) that caused new taxes 
on digital services to be introduced. Jones 
and Temouri (2016) discovered that high-tech 
companies use tax havens for the purposes of 
tax avoidance more than companies from other 
types of sectors. These results are in line with 
a study by Higgins et al. (2015), which shows 
that innovative companies are pioneers in 
international tax planning. On the other hand, 
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it is not only the digital sector that is known 
for having a lower tax burden compared to 
other sectors (European Commission, 2017); 
financial institutions also often use international 
tax planning (Gallemore et al., 2019) in 
connection with tax havens (Aubry & Dauphin, 
2017; Bouvatier et al., 2017; Murphy, 2015). 
This information about sectors has become an 
integral part of tax planning analysis (Delgado 
et al., 2014; Sorbe & Johansson, 2017); certain 
specific sector attributes impact the tax burden. 
How tax havens are used also differs across 
sectors for German multinationals (Gumpert et 
al., 2016). From the perspective of investment 
decision making, companies from sectors with 
a tendency to use tax planning are not affected 
by the tax burden of the new investment (Hong 
& Smart, 2010; Sorbe & Johansson, 2017). 
Such companies have the ability to minimize 
tax liabilities using the schemes that have been 
already established.
This paper provides a different perspective 
on tax planning, because it is focused only 
on subsidiaries linked to foreign owners. The 
model in the following section was developed 
based on these assumptions. The following 
hypotheses were established based on the 
theoretical background:
H1: A parent company located in a tax haven 
decreases a subsidiary’s tax burden.
H2: The level of indebtedness decreases 
a company’s tax burden.
H3: The ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets decreases a company’s tax burden.
When analyzing current research, it was 
obvious that there were some differences 
between sectors in terms of tax planning. 
Current studies have provided conclusions 
supporting the idea that certain sectors have 
better opportunities to use international tax 
planning and that these companies thus have 
a lower effective tax burden (e.g., the ICT or 
financial sectors). However, there is as yet 
no comparison of the sectors that use tax 
havens. Naturally, there should be differences 
in how sectors use tax havens, because they 
have different assets and capital structures; 
additionally, their core businesses are 
completely different. It is also worth mentioning 
that there are differences inside each sector. 
For these reasons, this paper is focused on 
the two sectors that are usually presented as 
having strong tendencies to use international 
tax planning: the ICT sector and the financial 
sector.
2.	 Data	and	Research	Methodology
Because the Czech Republic’s position 
concerning international tax planning is 
distinct, the data used covers only Czech 
companies. Because a company’s degree 
of internationalization is an important aspect 
(otherwise international tax planning is 
not possible), further analysis covers the 
component of the Czech companies that are 
owned from abroad, specifically from EU 
countries. For better results, panels of data from 
financial statements for the years 2013–2016 
are used; these were collected from Justice.cz 
(2018). Within studied period, 340 companies 
from ICT sector and 123 from financial sector 
were in the Czech Republic. Sectors are based 
on the classification CZ-NACE: ICT sector 
corresponds to section J and financial sector 
includes companies from section K. Tab. 1 
presents the basic data concerning sectors. It is 
worth mentioning that the dataset contains only 
companies with relevant economic activity, i.e., 
non-zero outcomes. The aim was to examine 
a balanced panel and therefore companies that 
were not active for all four years have been 
excluded. The extreme values have also been 
dropped from the dataset. As extreme values, 
e.g., negative values of intangible assets were 
considered. This might be a case of sale of part 
of the company in which revaluation differences 
arise. In some other cases, companies reported 
other parts of assets in negative values. On the 
other hand, when the value corresponded to 
a logical framework it was kept in the dataset. 
This study focuses on tax planning and some 
of the outliers can explain how the tax planning 
of Czech companies works. Overall, there were 
removed 125 companies in ICT sector and 85 
companies in financial sector. Especially in 
the financial sector, the number of removed 
companies is high. It shows that companies 
in financial sector has a higher degree of 
instability. More than half of the removed 
financial companies had zero outcomes. The 
panel data analysis was performed according 
to Greene (2012) and Wooldridge (2013).
The purpose of the model was to find 
determinants of the tax burden under Czech 
conditions from the perspective of subsidiaries 
of foreign multinationals; it is based on the 
approach presented by Jedlička (2019). 
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Regarding the fact that panel data was 
obtained, panel regression was used as the 
standard model. Panel regression has been 
used by several researchers, but this paper’s 
approach is different, especially in the case 
of the dependent variable. Because this study 
aims to assess the position of Czech companies 
as subsidiaries owned from different countries, 
the tax burden model needed to be customized 
to meet this requirement. The model is based 
on the assumption that a particular company is 
part of an international tax planning structure, 
and its tax liability is therefore affected by tax 
planning. Because the usual effective tax rate is 
based on profits, which are also affected by tax 
planning, this variable is not an option. The goal 
was to find a variable for which tax planning 
affects only tax liability. Other possibilities, e.g., 
the ratio of paid taxes to total assets, also have 
the problem that the denominator is dependent 
on the tax planning itself. Some of the tax 
planning schemes also affect the size of total 
assets, making the given ratio not suitable as 
a dependent variable. It is necessary to select 
a variable such that the denominator has no 
connection with international tax planning, with 
the effect of tax planning being concentrated 
exclusively in the component of paid taxes. This 
model offers the ratio of taxes to outcomes as 
a new dependent variable. Outcomes include 
sales of own products and services, activation 
and changes in inventories of own production. 
Outcomes are not affected by tax planning 
when it is assumed that the studied subsidiaries 
are located in a non-tax-haven country. 
Moreover, outcomes are the most suitable way 
to express the real economic activity of the 
operating subsidiaries. The rest of the model’s 
construction is based on current knowledge. 
The regression uses the assumptions for panel 
data regression and is presented in Formula (1):
 TXoutcomes = β0 + β1 ROAit +  
+ β2IAit + β3SIZEit + β4INDEBTit + 
+ β5INVit + β6THi + ai + uit 
(1)
There is an important assumption about 
why taxes divided by the outcomes linked to 
operating subsidiaries is able to reflect the 
tax planning. First of all, when a company 
uses tax planning, all tax planning activities 
take place between achieving the outcomes 
and paying taxes. Naturally, all known 
tax planning schemes do not affect the 
operating subsidiaries’ outcomes, because 
these outcomes are newly created value. In 
contrast, profit can be affected by several tax 
planning schemes; therefore, it can be said 
that outcome taxation better expresses the 
real tax burden.
In addition to Formula (1), a represents the 
unobserved individual effect and u represents 
the model’s error. The variables are described 
in Tab. 2, which also presents their basic 
descriptive statistics. The median of IA is 
0 and it means that most companies have 
no intangible assets. Similar situation has 
appeared also for the variable INV. Companies 
from ICT and financial sectors do not need as 
much inventory due to the characteristics of 
these industries.
Furthermore, it was also crucial to establish 
the group of EU tax havens. This part of the 
study is based on current research (Berkhout, 
2016; Chardonnet & Langerock, 2017; 
Jedlička, 2019). For the purposes of this study, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, and the 
Netherlands are considered EU tax havens. 
The data contains only the information about 
whether the company has an owner from 
a tax haven. Therefore, this variable remains 
unchanged over all periods.
Because the dataset can be considered 
panel data, panel regression was assumed 
for the model. Three types of regression 
were used: pooled OLS, regression with fixed 
effects, and regression with random effects. 
As for the explanatory power of the model, 
additional statistics tests were also conducted. 
Another important feature of the model deals 
with sectors. Because this paper intends to 
Sector ICT Financial Overall
Number of companies 215 38 253
% owners from tax havens 26.98% 28.95% 27.27%
Source: own
Tab. 1: Basic information about the dataset
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determine the impact of sectors – which is 
constant over time – panel regression with 
random effects was also conducted, regardless 
of the additional tests’ results (Wooldridge, 
2013). The tax haven dummy variable is also 
similar in nature, so panel regression with 
random effects is also important for discovering 
the effects of the specific owner’s location.
3.	 Results	and	Discussion
All results are based on the author’s own 
calculations using the software Gretl. Tab. 3 
presents the results of the OLS regression 
with the full dataset. The Breusch-Pagan 
test statistic demonstrates whether OLS 
regression is an appropriate type of regression. 
Regression with random effects is a more 
suitable model than OLS regression because 
Variable Description Mean Median St. deviation Minimum Maximum
TXoutcomes Paid taxes divided  by the outcomes 0.0257 0.0114 0.0505 0 0.7566
ROA Return on assets calculated using EBIT 0.0575 0.0830 0.6354 −9.9900 1.9800
IA Share of intangible assets in total assets 0.0305 0 0.1040 0 0.9669
SIZE Natural logarithm  of total assets 10.1985 10.0791 2.5999 2.4849 17.4888
INDEBT Liabilities divided  by total assets 0.6623 0.4998 1.0234 0 16.0232
INV Share of inventories  in total assets 0.0265 0 0.0951 0 0.8506
TH Dummy variable which express the presence of the owner in tax haven.
Source: own
Variable Coefficient Std. error T-share P-value
Constant 0.0282622 0.00937198 3.016 0.0026***
ROA 0.00929143 0.00257791 3.604 0.0003***
IA −0.0232054 0.0146480 −1.584 0.1135
SIZE 0.00245507 0.000680328 3.609 0.0003***
INDEBT −0.00180926 0.00160070 −1.130 0.2586
INV 0.0111627 0.0161319 0.6920 0.4891
TH −0.00590722 0.00358891 −1.646 0.1001
ICT −0.0293633 0.00471375 −6.229 6.88e−10***
Breusch-Pagan test statistic: LM = 552.89 with p-value = 2.95966e−122
Hausman test statistic: H = 12.16 with p-value = 0.0326598
Source: own
Note: *** statistically significant at a level of 0.01; ** statistically significant at a level of 0.05; * statistically significant at 
a level of 0.1.
Tab. 2: Variables and their descriptive statistics
Tab. 3: OLS regression
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of the low p-value. The second test (the 
Hausman test) provides information about the 
suitability of regression with random effects in 
comparison with fixed effects. At a 0.05 level of 
significance, the Hausman test preferred fixed 
effects regression. At the same time, this paper 
focuses on variables that are constant across 
all time periods, therefore regression with 
random effects was also used.
As to the specific results, the OLS 
regression indicated three important variables 
– ROA, SIZE, and the ICT sector dummy 
variable. However, both the other models 
provided more relevant results. Therefore, Tab. 
4 shows the results of the panel regression with 
fixed effects. Two important assumptions must 
be mentioned in conjunction with this method: 
constant variables have been excluded and 
time dummies have been added to the model.
Tab. 4 shows the results of the panel 
regression with fixed effects. This model best 
meets the requirements from the perspective 
of reliability. It reveals two important variables 
at the 0.05 level of significance: the share of 
intangible assets (a negative effect) and the 
size of the company (a positive effect). The 
variables, which are constant over time, are 
included within the fixed effects.
Although this model does not provide any 
information connected to the constant variables, 
the importance of intangible assets could also 
indicate the differences between the financial 
and the ICT sector. However, the variant with 
random effects was also conducted to better 
identify the significance of the other variables.
The results of the panel regression with 
random effects are presented in Tab. 5. This 
model shows the significance not only of 
the company’s size and its intangible assets 
but also of its profitability and the ICT sector 
dummy variable. The significance of belonging 
to a specific sector can be seen here as an 
especially important result. The random effects 
model, like the OLS one, did not indicate the 
parent company’s location as important.
Neither panel regression revealed any time 
effects. Overall, all three models demonstrated 
the significance of company size. In other 
aspects, the models did have certain differences. 
However, the importance of intangible assets 
and the ICT sector dummy was indicated in all 
models. From the perspective of profitability, the 
conclusions were not as strong, because the 
best model (with fixed effects) did not recognize 
it as a significant independent variable.
Previous results have shown significant 
differences between the two sectors studied. 
The ICT sector was revealed to have the 
Variable Coefficient Std. error T-share P-value
Constant −0.0283502 0.0278581 −1.018 0.3092
ROA 0.00275833 0.00195623 1.410 0.1589
IA −0.0586059 0.0169774 −3.452 0.0006***
SIZE 0.00536936 0.00272712 1.969 0.0493**
INDEBT −0.000962872 0.00207156 −0.4648 0.6422
INV −0.00533159 0.0209439 −0.2546 0.7991
Time dummy 2 0.00214280 0.00269838 0.7941 0.4274
Time dummy 3 0.00168664 0.00275520 0.6122 0.5406
Time dummy 4 0.00280458 0.00283992 0.9876 0.3237
LSDV R-squared = 0.741227
Within R-squared = 0.037476
Source: own
Note: ***statistically significant at a level of 0.01; **statistically significant at a level of 0.05; *statistically significant at 
a level of 0.1.
Tab. 4: Panel regression with fixed effects
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lower tax burden. In order to identify additional 
differences, the same three models were used 
again but with data from each sector individually. 
These models focused on the differences in 
the tax burden between sectors and show how 
companies from the two selected sectors use 
tax planning.
Tab. 6 presents the OLS regressions 
for both the ICT and financial sectors. The 
coefficients of the individual variables as well 
as their significance differ. As to the ICT sector, 
profitability, intangible assets, and size are the 
main drivers of the tax burden. On the other 
hand, for the financial sector, the only variable 
Variable Coefficient Std. error Z P-value
Constant 0.0198454 0.0147637 1.344 0.1789
ROA 0.00397061 0.0018894 2.102 0.0356**
IA −0.0465778 0.0147134 −3.166 0.0015***
SIZE 0.00299253 0.00106579 2.808 0.0050***
INDEBT −0.00170844 0.00167649 −1.019 0.3082
INV 0.00124161 0.0173681 0.07149 0.9430
TH −0.00624857 0.00600526 −1.041 0.2981
ICT −0.0269972 0.00779359 −3.464 0.0005***
Time dummy 2 0.00265878 0.00267439 0.9942 0.3201
Time dummy 3 0.00244042 0.00268375 0.9093 0.3632
Time dummy 4 0.00383191 0.00271118 1.413 0.1575
Source: own
Note: ***statistically significant at a level of 0.01; **statistically significant at a level of 0.05; *statistically significant at 
a level of 0.1.
Tab. 5: Panel regression with random effects
Variable
ICT Financial	sector
Coefficient Std. error T-share P-value Coefficient Std. error T-share P-value
Constant 0.003508 0.006066 0.5783 0.5632 0.025684 0.043917 0.5848 0.5596
ROA 0.008252 0.002154 3.831 0.0001*** 0.041980 0.024470 1.716 0.0884*
IA −0.024695 0.012045 −2.050 0.0406** −0.243222 0.422459 −0.5757 0.5657
SIZE 0.001834 0.000622 2.947 0.0033*** 0.003054 0.003047 1.002 0.3179
INDEBT −0.002108 0.001354 −1.557 0.1198 0.001822 0.012323 0.1478 0.8827
INV 0.011188 0.013239 0.8450 0.3983 −3.47228 8.74177 −0.3972 0.6918
TH 0.000599 0.003314 0.1806 0.8567 −0.033604 0.014989 −2.242 0.0265**
Added tests
Breusch-Pagan test statistic:
LM = 497.728 with p-value = 2.96742e−110
Hausman test statistic:
H = 17.2453 with p-value = 0.00405734
Breusch-Pagan test statistic:
LM = 68.3805 with p-value = 1.34804e−16
Hausman test statistic:
H = 3.21523 with p-value = 0.666843
Source: own
Note: ***statistically significant at a level of 0.01; **statistically significant at a level of 0.05; *statistically significant at 
a level of 0.1.
Tab. 6: OLS regression: ICT vs. the financial sector
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that is statistically significant at the level of 
0.05 is tax havens. Moreover, there are also 
differences in the additional tests. The Breusch-
Pagan test shows that the type of regression 
used in these OLS models is not suitable for 
either sector. On the other hand, the Hausman 
test favors the fixed effects model for the ICT 
sector but the random effects model for the 
financial sector.
Similar to the approach above, panel 
regression with fixed effects is used with the 
results presented in Tab. 7. For the ICT sector, 
the share of intangible assets has a negative 
effect on the tax burden while size has a positive 
effect. The results for the financial sector show 
only one significant variable: the dummy for 
the last year (2016). It is important to mention 
that no independent variable used in the model 
was considered statistically significant for the 
tax burden in the financial sector. This is also 
the reason why the additional tests favor the 
random effects model. This situation indicates 
that there are other variables not included in 
this model that are particularly important for the 
financial sector.
Tab. 8 presents the panel regression with 
random effects for the ICT and financial sectors. 
The results are similar to the model with fixed 
effects with one exception: profitability is 
also included in the set of variables that are 
important drivers of the tax burden in the ICT 
sector at a significance level of 0.05. As to the 
financial sector, the results of the model with 
random effects are overall the same as those 
for the regression with fixed effects.
Overall, the regressions showed that there 
are significant differences between the ICT and 
financial sectors. This is valid not only in terms 
of their tax burden level but also in terms of 
the variables that can explain their tax burden. 
Regarding the ICT sector, the model gave 
satisfactory results. On the other hand, the 
same model provided noticeably worse results 
when used for companies from the financial 
sector, with none of the predicted variables 
able to be considered significant. There is only 
a shift to a higher tax burden in the fourth year.
The individual hypotheses were assessed 
based on these results. H1 was rejected, 
because there was no regression with higher 
explanatory power that indicated the tax haven 
dummy variable was significant. H2 was also 
rejected. Indebtedness does not have any 
impact on the tax burden of Czech subsidiaries. 
On the other hand, H3 was confirmed. Most 
models demonstrated that the share of 
intangible assets was a statistically significant 
variable with a negative impact on a company’s 
tax burden.
Most studies in international tax planning 
show the importance of a tax haven connection 
providing tax burden reduction (Markle & 
Variable
ICT Financial	sector
Coefficient Std. error T-share P-value Coefficient Std. error T-share P-value
Constant −0.059002 0.023544 −2.506 0.0125** 0.161894 0.149602 1.082 0.2816
ROA 0.002728 0.001584 1.723 0.0854* −0.003102 0.019995 −0.1551 0.8770
IA −0.060315 0.013538 −4.455 9.90e−6*** −0.519161 0.704835 −0.7366 0.4630
SIZE 0.008385 0.002416 3.470 0.0006*** −0.008173 0.011486 −0.7116 0.4783
INDEBT −0.000387 0.001696 −0.2281 0.8197 −0.013281 0.015861 −0.8373 0.4043
INV −0.007236 0.016665 −0.4342 0.6643 2.01316 9.58448 0.2100 0.8340
Time d.3 0.001393 0.002339 0.5956 0.6643 0.003818 0.012213 0.3126 0.7552
Time d.2 −0.000682 0.002398 −0.2845 0.7761 0.012858 0.012478 1.030 0.3052
Time d.4 −0.001892 0.002475 −0.7645 0.4449 0.027747 0.012743 2.177 0.0317**
LSDV R-squared = 0.742490
Within R-squared = 0.069956
LSDV R-squared = 0.712428
Within R-squared = 0.055374
Source: own
Note: ***statistically significant at a level of 0.01; **statistically significant at a level of 0.05; *statistically significant at 
a level of 0.1.
Tab. 7: Panel regression with fixed effects: ICT vs. the financial sector
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Shackelford, 2014; Davies et al., 2018). 
Regarding Czech companies, the situation 
is not as clear. Current studies show that 
there are probably differences between tax 
havens (Janský & Kokeš, 2015; Janský, 2017). 
Moreover they indicate that the principle of using 
tax havens covers more than just the tax issue 
– rather, financial secrecy is also important for 
Czech companies (Rohan & Moravec, 2017). 
The impact a tax haven connection has on 
the tax burden seems to be not as strong as 
in other countries. However, this situation has 
an empirical explanation. There are studies 
showing that profit shifting is not just for 
purposes of tax avoidance but that it is generally 
common to show preference for the parent 
company (Dischinger et al., 2014). Profit shifting 
is present even when there is no tax haven 
connection. Dischinger et al. (2014) show that 
profits are shifted based on the tax differential 
but that managers prefer to shift profits to parent 
companies if the tax rate is similar. Because 
this study is focused on companies that are 
subsidiaries of foreign parent companies, the 
model’s results – taking into account the current 
research – show that profit shifting is linked to 
the majority of foreign subsidiaries. These profits 
are shifted to the parent companies no matter 
where they are located.
Unlike the papers by Janský and Kokeš 
(2015) or Ištok and Kanderová (2019), this study 
does not confirm the importance of a company’s 
indebtedness as it relates to international 
tax planning. Because similar data samples 
have produced different results, it would be 
appropriate to conduct further research on 
this variable. In particular, companies from the 
financial sector are proposed for further study, 
because it can be expected that this sector 
uses intra-group loans.
Intangible assets are definitely used for 
tax avoidance; this study proves their use 
within the ICT sector. Companies with a higher 
percentage of intangible assets are linked to 
a lower tax burden. This is in line with previous 
studies that demonstrate the important role 
intangible assets play in tax avoidance (Griffith 
et al., 2014; Arcalean, 2017; Klassen et al., 
2017). When a company has intangible assets, 
it can benefit more from tax avoidance, because 
intangible assets provide managers with more 
tax planning options to choose from.
Concerning the other determinants, 
company size was shown to be a variable with 
a positive impact on tax burden. It can be stated 
that companies with more assets pay higher 
taxes. The reasons why smaller companies 
have a lower tax burden cannot be determined 
Variable
ICT Financial	sector
Coefficient Std. error Z P-value Coefficient Std. error Z P-value
Constant −0.006715 0.009488 −0.7077 0.4791 0.059603 0.065457 0.9106 0.3625
ROA 0.003760 0.001538 2.444 0.0145** 0.006330 0.018923 0.3345 0.7380
IA −0.049907 0.011895 −4.196 2.72e−5*** −0.350310 0.519536 −0.6743 0.5001
SIZE 0.0029572 0.000979 3.020 0.0025*** 0.000459 0.004722 0.09714 0.9226
INDEBT −0.001740 0.001398 −1.244 0.2135 −0.008738 0.012298 −0.7105 0.4774
INV 0.000101 0.014044 0.0072 0.9943 0.806338 8.46481 0.09526 0.9241
TH −0.001130 0.005582 −0.2025 0.8395 −0.037433 0.025247 −1.483 0.1382
Time d.3 0.002498 0.002321 1.077 0.2817 0.003882 0.012070 0.3216 0.7478
Time d.2 0.000982 0.002331 0.4212 0.6736 0.011480 0.012156 0.9444 0.3450
Time d.4 0.000289 0.002359 0.1224 0.9026 0.025050 0.012202 2.053 0.0401**
Wald joint test on time dummies –
Chi-squared(3) = 4.88547 with p-value = 0.180378
Source: own
Note: ***statistically significant at a level of 0.01; **statistically significant at a level of 0.05; *statistically significant at 
a level of 0.1.
Tab. 8: Panel regression with random effects: ICT vs. the financial sector
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from the results. When this result is placed in 
the context of previous studies, the situation 
becomes clear. Nowadays, there are many 
examples of media publicity for large groups 
and their tax planning activities (Campbell & 
Helleloid, 2016; European Commission, 2020). 
Larger companies have to take better care of 
their reputation and often employ a policy called 
corporate social responsibility – tax avoidance 
is not in line with this attitude (Gribnau, 2015). 
On the other hand, Czech companies do not 
emphasize their fair tax payments (Svoboda, 
2016).
The last important independent variable 
(the ICT sector dummy variable) opens the 
discussion about sectors, because companies 
from the ICT sector have a lower tax burden 
than companies from the financial sector. 
Their type of activity is completely different; 
moreover, their flexible organizational structure 
and new types of company management offer 
better opportunities for employing tax planning. 
This type of reasoning was also mentioned in 
Higgins et al. (2015) and Jones and Temouri 
(2016). From the perspective of governments 
and international organizations, the tendency 
is to apply special taxation regimes to ICT 
companies.
When it comes to comparing the studied 
sectors, it is obvious that the model is only 
relevant for the ICT sector. No dependency 
was revealed when the companies from the 
financial sector were assessed – except for 
one; the time dummy variable for 2016 had 
a positive effect on the tax burden. Financial 
companies showed higher tax liabilities in 
2016. This situation could have been caused 
by media publicity of the obligations linked to 
Country-by-Country Reporting and of studies 
connected to this (Aubry & Dauphin, 2017; 
Janský, 2017). The financial sector has become 
one of the most studied from the view of tax 
planning; therefore, financial managers are 
more careful with their tax planning activities. 
When the p-values associated with the time 
dummy variables were compared, it could 
be seen that companies from the financial 
sector paid higher tax liabilities over time. On 
the other hand, the additional test for the time 
variables did not confirm any time effect (see 
Tab. 8). Because the other additional tests (see 
Tab. 6) favor regression with random effects, 
the explanation for dependence linked to the 
tax burden is different. As mentioned above, 
managers must pay attention to the public’s 
view of their companies’ activities. Dyreng et al. 
(2010) show that managers’ personalities also 
have an impact on companies’ tax planning 
structures. The role of the differences between 
managers is also the subject of studies by 
Francis et al. (2014) and Christensen et 
al. (2015), both of which achieved similar 
conclusions, i.e., that managers also influence 
tax planning activities. When combined with the 
preference of regression with random effects 
for the financial sector, this fact indicates that 
the role of managers within the financial sector 
is stronger than in the ICT sector. Because the 
ICT sector belongs to the high-tech industry, the 
propensity for tax planning is much greater. On 
the other hand, the traditional financial sector is 
accompanied by random effects, so managers 
become drivers for the tax planning attitude. The 
financial sector includes people with different 
approaches to risk. There are careful managers 
who especially take the public’s view of its 
activities into account and hesitate to use tax 
planning schemes. As to the other managers, 
the economic benefits of tax planning outweigh 
the threat of a deteriorating reputation. Another 
limitation can be seen in shorter period 
because regressions do not reveal any long-
term effect, especially connected with strategy 
of companies. On the other hand, longer period 
would mean smaller balanced panel in terms of 
number of companies.
There is also a limitation that goes hand in 
hand with one of the model’s positive aspects 
(the unique view on operating subsidiaries 
owned from abroad). This model only focuses 
on the aspect of Czech companies that can be 
connected with tax planning activities. Based 
on this limitation, the model is not suitable for all 
Czech companies. Naturally, when evaluating 
tax planning, purely Czech companies are not 
a relevant part of the dataset. On the other 
hand, it is worth mentioning that tax planning 
can also be present in Czech companies that 
have subsidiaries in foreign countries. This 
implies that possible future research could 
focus on companies as parent companies 
within tax planning schemes. Subsequent 
to this research, it would be constructive to 
compare these two types of connections 
companies have to foreign countries. This 
opens the discussion about another important 
factor possibly affecting the tax burden that 
has not been addressed by current studies, 
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position within a group. When companies linked 
to foreign countries are studied, the dataset 
contains differences between the subsidiaries’ 
positions. Some companies are originally from 
the Czech Republic and have been bought by 
a foreign company, some of them have been 
established by a multinational, some may 
be directly owned by the parent company of 
an entire group, or the distance between the 
head of the group and operating company 
may be much greater. The last example would 
be suitable for demonstrating the impact on 
tax planning. When there are many channels 
within which tax planning can be applied, there 
are more possibilities to avoid paying taxes. 
Moreover, when tax planning activities can be 
equally distributed between all the channels, 
the effects of tax avoidance are more difficult 
to detect.
In light of this paper confirming significant 
differences between sectors, subjects of 
further research should not include only 
company managers and a company’s position 
within a group. Researchers should take into 
account the differences between sectors and 
ideally study them individually. In view of the 
differences between sectors, the initiative of 
several countries (Asen, 2019) to introduce 
digital taxes makes sense. On the other hand, 
when companies from certain sectors face 
lower (or higher) taxation, it does not affect their 
competitive standing, because the situation 
within the sector is the same for all its members.
Conclusions
The model introduced here provides a new 
approach to international tax planning models, 
because its primary focus is the tax burden of 
subsidiaries. Naturally, when a multinational 
group applies tax planning, the tax burden of 
the whole group decreases. The question then 
arises of how this affects the tax burden of the 
operating subsidiary. Because a subsidiary can 
be part of a tax planning scheme, its tax burden 
can also be affected by tax avoidance. For 
these purposes, a new dependent variable was 
introduced: taxes divided by outcomes.
The model demonstrated different situations 
for the two sectors selected, ICT and financial 
sector. Both of these are described as sectors 
with a greater tendency to use tax havens. With 
regards to the fact that tax havens have no 
effect on tax burden, companies in these two 
sectors use profit shifting in the direction of the 
parent companies. Intangible assets are used 
for tax planning in the ICT sector; however, 
the tax burden of companies from the financial 
sector is influenced by random effects that are 
probably linked to managerial approach.
Further research on international tax 
planning should include not only information 
about sectors, but it is also necessary to 
approach each sector individually. It would 
be constructive for other experts to take into 
account alternative qualitative attributes 
affecting the tax burden. The current situation 
has brought about new types of taxation that are 
intended only for certain companies. Therefore, 
the differences between sectors will widen, 
but not from the perspective of the tax burden 
(sectoral taxation should help balance out the 
tax environment); rather, the determinants in 
similar models will begin to show even more 
variation across the sectors.
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